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Abstract
We study a model of task completion with the opportunity to learn about own self-
control problems over time. While the agent is initially uncertain about her future
self-control, in each period she can choose to learn about it by paying a non-negative
learning cost and spending one period. If the agent has time-consistent preferences,
she always chooses to learn whenever the learning is beneficial. If the agent has time-
inconsistent preferences, however, she may procrastinate such a learning opportunity.
Further, if her time preferences exhibit inter-temporal conflicts between future selves
(e.g., hyperbolic discounting), the procrastination of learning can occur even when
the learning cost is zero. The procrastination also leads to a non-completion of the
task. When the agent has multiple initially-uncertain attributes (e.g., own future self-
control and own ability for the task), the agent’s endogenous learning decisions may
be misdirected — she chooses to learn what she should not learn from her initial
perspective, and she chooses not to learn what she should.
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1 Introduction
People procrastinate (i.e., make a delay that was not fully anticipated ex-ante) filing tax
returns, doing a report, setting up a financial portfolio, or making educational decisions,.1
In some situations, people keep procrastinating the same or similar tasks again and again.
Such “naivete” about own future self-control appears prevalent in many economic environ-
ments, and theoretical and empirical literature has investigated its implications. Most of the
literature, however, assumes (either explicitly or implicitly) that people do not learn about
their self-control problems over time. This opens up a natural question: why do people not
learn?
Building upon the literature on naivete about self-control developed by O’Donoghue and
Rabin (1999a, 2001), we investigate whether and when a time-inconsistent agent does not
learn about her self-control problem over time when she faces a task to complete.2 Section
2 introduces our model and discusses its key assumptions. In our basic model, an agent is
initially not sure whether her future selves will be time-consistent or time-inconsistent, and
she may initially underestimate her probability of being time-inconsistent. In each period,
however, she actively chooses whether or not to learn about her own self-control problem
(which may affect her subsequent actions on task completion) by incurring a non-negative
cost of learning. We highlight the case in which the cost of learning is zero and the agent
can (in principle) perfectly learn about her future self-control. Crucially, we assume that the
agent cannot choose learning and working on the task at the same time and that she cannot
commit to any future actions.
Section 3 analyzes an illustrative model of task completion. Our key mechanism is that
the agent may procrastinate learning about her own self-control. The intuition consists of two
1 Following O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) and DellaVigna (2009), we say that an agent “procrastinates”
if she plans to do a task with some probability but actually does it with lower probability, whereas an
agent “delays” if she plans not to do a task with some probability and actually does not do it with the
same probability. For evidence of procrastination, see, for example, Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) and
DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006).
2 For papers analyzing task completion and procrastination, see, for example, O’Donoghue and Rabin
(1999b), Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002), O’Donoghue and Rabin (2008), Herweg and Mu¨ller (2011), and
Fischer (2018).
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steps. First, because learning itself changes own future actions, a time-inconsistent agent
may indirectly incur a cost from learning if changing future actions involves both future
benefits (e.g., returns from setting up a financial portfolio) and future costs (e.g., effort cost
to set up a financial portfolio).3 Second, because the time-inconsistent type of agent initially
underestimates the probability that she will be time-inconsistent, she may (erroneously)
believe that she will learn and complete a task with a high probability even when she does
not do so now, and hence she may prefer to postpone the learning opportunity in order to
complete the task later than sooner.4 As a result, the agent may not use the opportunity to
learn about her own self-control problem, even when the direct cost of learning is zero. We
also derive conditions in which procrastination of learning and non-completion of a task is a
unique equilibrium outcome. Our result helps explain why people procrastinate even when
they face similar situations repeatedly.
This non-learning result has the following implications. First, if people have time-
inconsistent preferences and cannot commit to future actions, they may not learn about
their self-control problems even when the cost of learning is zero. This result is in contrast
to the one by Ali (2011) who shows that time-inconsistent people will perfectly learn about
their self-control if they can take up a flexible commitment device and the agent’s beliefs are
automatically updated. In this sense, our results help bridge the gap between his theoretical
result and the empirical prevalence of naivete. Second, even when people are inherently
aware of their own self-control problem, whenever facing a new task they may prefer to
neglect their awareness and take an action as an ignorant self. Perhaps surprisingly, this
result does not depend on anticipatory utility, ego utility, private image, or social image
(e.g., Ko˝szegi 2006, Gottlieb 2014, 2016).
3 We show that this indirect cost occurs when an agent’s time preferences exhibit intra-personal conflicts
between future selves (e.g., hyperbolic discounting). In contrast, there is no such an indirect cost when she has
intra-personal conflicts only between her current self and future selves (e.g., quasi-hyperbolic discounting).
4 Note that the second logic looks akin to the one in O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a, 2001). However, we
identify assumptions and conditions for when and how procrastination can occur in the domain of learning
about own self-control problems, whereas O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a, 2001) assume that an agent cannot
learn about it over time. We further show that procrastination of learning can occur even when the direct
cost of learning is zero under general time-inconsistent preferences, whereas it does not occur under quasi-
hyperbolic discounting which is employed by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a, 2001).
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Section 4 analyzes a model of task choice, where an agent first chooses a task to complete
and then engages in the task. To describe the result by using a real-world example, suppose
that an agent chooses to either pursue a university degree, do an apprenticeship, or postpone
the decision. If she knew she were time-consistent, she would go to university now. If she
knew she were time-inconsistent, the high upfront cost of the university degree is too much
for her, so she would be better off by choosing the apprenticeship now. But if she is time-
inconsistent and does not know her future self-control type, she may believe that her future
selves would be time-consistent with a high probability. Given this belief and her time-
inconsistent preferences, she may prefer to go to university next year but not now. This is
why she does not start the apprenticeship now, and once next year comes she may postpone
to go to university again; she may never complete any further education. In a general model,
we derive conditions under which a time-inconsistent type of agent neither chooses a task
nor learns about own future self-control, which leads to non-completion of any task.
As an important extension, Section 5 investigates a case in which an agent initially has
multiple uncertain attributes and can choose to learn about either (or both) of them. For
example, the agent may be initially uncertain about both her own future self-control and
own ability for the task. We show that the agent’s endogenous learning decisions may be
misdirected — she chooses to learn what she should not learn from the initial perspective,
and she chooses not to learn what she should learn from the initial perspective.
Section 6 briefly discusses other extensions. Section 7 concludes. Proofs and additional
analysis are provided in the Appendix.
Related literature. There are several strands of literature that investigate why people do
not learn over time. The most closely related literature to our paper is on strategic ignorance:
Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) and Be´nabou and Tirole (2002) show, under the presence of self-
control problems, how an agent may strategically abstain from learning about own ability
for the task to keep motivating their own future selves to work harder (in these papers, the
strategic ignorance is beneficial from the agent’s initial perspective). Relatedly, Be´nabou and
Tirole (2004) study how an agent may commit to a personal rule to maintain self-reputation.
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The implications of our results are quite different, however: in our model, strategic ignorance
is harmful from the agent’s initial perspective because it leads to a non-completion of a task.5
Furthermore, we demonstrate that if the agent is uncertain about both future self-control
and ability, then under some situations the agent’s learning decisions are misdirected and
harmful.
Among the literature on self-esteem, Ko˝szegi (2006), Gottlieb (2014), and Gottlieb (2016)
investigate models in which an agent may avoid learning because of the presence of ego utility,
private image, or anticipatory utility. In our model, such psychological costs are captured as
a direct cost of learning. We show that non-learning can occur even when there is no direct
(physical or psychological) cost of learning.
The literature on selective attention, such as Schwartzstein (2014) and Gagnon-Bartsch,
Rabin and Schwartzstein (2018), analyzes situations in which an agent systematically does
not encode a certain type of signal. In contrast to the literature, we focus on the situation in
which the cost of learning can be zero and an agent can perfectly learn about own self-control
problems, but the agent may actively choose not to learn about it.6
Finally, our result on multiple initially-uncertain attributes is related to the recent liter-
ature on learning under misspecified models (Fudenberg, Romanyuk and Strack 2017, Hei-
dhues, Ko˝szegi and Strack 2018, Hestermann and Le Yaouanq 2017). Building upon and
extending this literature, our mechanism based on procrastination explains why an agent’s
learning decisions can be misdirected even when she can choose to perfectly learn about all
initially-uncertain attributes.
5 There is also a difference regarding the mechanisms: an agent in these studies chooses not to learn as
a means of internal commitment (and to improve own future payoffs), whereas an agent in our paper does
so because she overestimates the probability that she will behave time consistently.
6 In a similar way, our results also differ from the literature on non-Bayesian updating rules in which an
agent cannot update her own beliefs according to Bayes’ rule. Further, most of them (e.g., conservatisms)
would predict that learning is merely slowed down but would occur eventually (see Benjamin, Rabin and
Raymond (2016) for a notable exception).
5
2 Model
This section introduces our basic model. Section 2.1 sets up the model. Section 2.2 discusses
our key assumptions.
2.1 Setup
A risk-neutral agent can choose a task from a menu of tasks in periods t = 1, 2, · · · , T , where
T ≥ 2 is either finite or infinite. Once she chooses a task, from the next period on she can
complete the task.7 Each task is represented by x = (−c, b): completing the task in period t
gives a cost c ≥ 0 in period t and brings a benefit b ≥ 0 in period t+1. There is no (physical
or psychological) cost of choosing a task. The agent can choose (and complete) at most one
task throughout the game.
Let ut denote the agent’s period-t instantaneous utility. There are two types of agents:
time-consistent and time-inconsistent ones. The type of each agent is persistent throughout
the game. For the time-consistent type, her total utility in period t is ∑∞τ=t δτ−tuτ with
δ ∈ (0, 1). For the time-inconsistent type, her total utility in period t is ∑∞τ=tD(τ − t)uτ ,
where D(τ − t) ∈ (0, 1] represents her time discounting in τ − t periods.8 We assume that
D(0) = 1, D(1) < δ, D(t) ≥ D(τ) for all t ≥ 0 and τ ≥ t, and D(1)/D(0) 6= D(2)/D(1).
Both types are initially uncertain about their own future self-control. We assume that
all types of the agent share the same initial belief and that their initial belief about their
own future time-consistency, denoted by Dˆ(t), is Dˆ(t) = D(t) with probability 1 − q and
Dˆ(t) = δt with probability q.9 In line with the literature on limited cognition and beliefs
as assets (Be´nabou 2015, Be´nabou and Tirole 2016), we assume that updating the initial
7 Motivated by real-world examples such as making educational decisions (and then studying) or setting
up a financial portfolio (and then using it to accumulate savings), we focus on situations in which an agent
takes multiple steps to complete a task in our main model.
8 See, for example, Echenique, Imai and Saito (2017) for the analysis under general time preferences.
Relatedly, Schweighofer-Kodritsch (2018) analyzes Rubinstein’s alternative bargaining problem with general
time preferences.
9 In some applications, it could make more sense to assume that a time-consistent type knows own future
self-control, whereas a time-inconsistent type is initially (stochastically) overconfident about own future
self-control. As we will discuss later, none of our results would qualitatively change with this alternative
specification.
6
belief about own self-control requires the agent to actively choose to learn. Formally, in each
period the agent can acquire a signal about her own self-control by incurring a cost m ≥ 0,
while she sticks to her initial beliefs if she has not acquired the signal. To focus on our
main mechanism, we assume that learning is perfect and perpetual: the signal is perfectly
informative and the agent becomes completely sophisticated about their own self-control
problems for the rest of the game. It is worth emphasizing that learning is made by the
agent’s active choice, as we discuss in detail in Section 2.2.
Let k ∈ {C, I} be the agent’s true discounting type, where C represents a time-consistent
type and I represents a time-inconsistent type. Let UCt (x; τ − t) = −δτ−tc + δτ−t+1b and
U It (x; τ− t) = −D(τ− t)c+D(τ− t+1)b denote type-C’s and type-I’s total utility evaluated
in period t (not taking into account the learning cost m) when she completes task x in
period τ , respectively. We denote the agent’s decision of acquiring a signal about own self-
control (i.e., her learning decision) in period t by st ∈ {0, 1}. If the agent has already
acquired the signal (i.e., st0 = 1 for some t0 < t), the cost of learning m ≥ 0 has been
paid, and hence the agent’s utility only depends on when she will complete the task. Note
that, at the beginning of period τ , the agent has not learned if and only if st = 0 for
all t < τ . Before acquiring a signal, each type of agent’s subjective expectation of total
utility evaluated in period t when she acquires a signal about her type in period t0 ≥ 0 is
Uˆkt (st0 = 1) = qUkt (x(C); τ(C)− t) + (1− q)Ukt (x(I); τ(I)− t), where x(k) and τ(k) indicate
the tasks and completion periods for an agent of type k after learning her type at t0. We
abbreviate subscript t whenever it is clear. Note that the utility is evaluated according
to each type’s own preferences: the only reason for why each type of agent cares about
own future preferences is to predict future outcomes, and each period-t self maximizes own
period-t utility given her (possibly wrong) expectations.
The timing of the game is as follows. If the agent has not chosen a task, in each period
she takes one of the following actions: learning about her own self-control problem (if she
has not yet done so), choosing a task, or not doing anything. If the agent has chosen a task,
in each period the agent takes one of the following actions: learning about own self-control
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problem (if she has not yet done so), completing the task, or not doing anything.
As an equilibrium concept, we adopt a natural extension of the perception-perfect equi-
libria (O’Donoghue and Rabin 2001) in which (i) in each continuation game an agent chooses
her best response given her current belief and preference and (ii) an agent keeps using the
initial prior about her own self-control problem if she has not acquired a signal about own
self-control.10 We focus on pure strategies. While all of our theoretical results are descrip-
tive, whenever we discuss potential welfare implications, we evaluate each type of agent’s
welfare based on her initial-self’s preference.
2.2 Discussion of Key Assumptions
Active learning. A crucial assumption of our model is that the agent has to actively
choose in order to learn own self-control problem: whenever updating her beliefs, she has
to “encode” a signal (e.g., she needs to introspect from own past experience).11 Hence, our
model is different from a classical one in which Bayesian updating happens automatically.
It is also different from self-confirming equilibrium, as the agent in our model updates her
beliefs only when she chooses to do so.12 In our model, learning is analyzed through the lens
of the agent’s cost-benefit analysis.
Unless the agent chooses to learn, she does not revise her beliefs and keeps using her
prior belief. Hence, unlike Be´nabou and Tirole (2004), we rule out self-signaling over time.
We also assume away the possibility that the agent becomes aware of her own self-control
by inferring from own current preferences and beliefs (i.e., we assume away inferences like
“because my preferences are time-inconsistent today, I must be a time-inconsistent type
in the future”).13 These assumptions are consistent with our assumption that the agent
10 The second part is a natural extension of O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001), because a (partially) naive
present-biased agent in their original model does not update beliefs about own future self-control over time.
11 In period t = 1, we interpret the learning opportunity as the option for the agent to look back to similar
past experiences to infer her self-control problem. In period t ≥ 2, the agent can try to learn about her own
self-control problem from own past actions in the game.
12 Esponda and Pouzo (2016) provide a framework to analyze agents with misspecified models. Note that
our model is also different from theirs because in our model the agent can actively choose whether or not to
update own initial belief.
13 Akin to the discussion in Footnote 8 of O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001), a time-inconsistent type in our
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has to actively choose to update her belief, and are also in line with the assumptions in
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a, 2001). In contrast to these two papers, however, our model
does not exclude the possibility of learning by assumption. Indeed, our results complement
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a, 2001) in the sense that, given the conditions provided in this
paper, their original insight and results are robust to introducing the opportunity to learn
own self-control.
(At most) one action per period. Another assumption is that the agent cannot choose
learning and other actions at the same time (i.e., an agent has to spend one period to update
her beliefs). While this assumption is restrictive, it captures the notion that we need to spend
time to think about ourselves whenever changing our self-perception. This “time cost” is a
key to generate an intra-personal conflict between future selves (and hence procrastination of
learning). In other words, an agent in our model can be Bayesian, but the Bayesian inference
is not free: the agent needs to pay the cost of learning m ≥ 0 and spend some time to think
through.14
Note again that the cost of learning itself can be zero. One of the contributions of this
paper is to highlight how an agent may not learn about own future self-control even when
the learning cost is zero (i.e., m = 0), and how this can be a unique equilibrium outcome. A
positive learning cost (i.e., m > 0) represents a physical recollection cost or a psychological
cost of deteriorating self-esteem (Ko˝szegi 2006; Gottlieb 2014, 2016). Incorporating such a
learning cost is plausible in many real-world situations, and comparative statics with respect
to m generate additional implications.
No commitment. In the model, the agent cannot commit to any particular future be-
havior, including future learning decisions. In Section 6, we discuss the case in which an
model does not make such an inference. That is, a time-inconsistent type cannot revise her beliefs unless
she acquires information about own self-control. By contrast, all of our results are qualitatively robust (and
often become simpler) if a time-consistent type becomes aware of own future self-control by inferring from
the fact that she is currently time-consistent.
14 Note that this assumption may not be necessary if future selves can misuse the acquired information from
the perspective on today’s self. To both simply the analysis and highlight the procrastination mechanism,
we shut down such a possibility in our main model.
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agent takes up a future commitment device. If the agent can commit to own future actions,
under zero learning cost, non-learning would not occur in our model. In this respect, our
non-learning result complements the study by Ali (2011) who shows that time-inconsistent
people will perfectly learn about their self-control if they can take up a flexible commitment
device and do Bayesian updating automatically.
3 Task Completion
This section analyzes an illustrative model of task completion: we focus on the case in which
the agent is facing a menu of only one task x = (c, b) and, therefore, has already selected this
task. We can then restrict attention to the agent’s learning and task completion choices. To
shed light on our main mechanism in the simplest manner, we further assume throughout
this section that the agent can work on the task only after acquiring a signal about own
self-control.15 In Section 4, we analyze a full model without these assumptions.
3.1 Task Completion: Setup
The timing throughout this section is as follows. If the agent has not acquired a signal
st ∈ {0, 1} about her self-control problem, in each period she chooses to either acquire it
(st = 1) or not (st = 0). If the agent has acquired it, in each period the agent chooses
whether to complete the task or not.
In what follows, we focus on the most interesting case in which each type of agent prefers
to complete the task as soon as possible rather than never:
Assumption 1 (Task is worthwhile). (i) U I(x; 0) > 0, (ii) min{UC(x; 1), U I(x; 1)} > m.
Because UC(x; 0) ≥ U I(x; 0) by the assumption D(1) < δ, Assumption 1 (i) means that
each type of agent prefers to complete the task right now rather than never.16 Assumption 1
15 As we formally analyze in Section 4, this is optimal when working on a task without learning is costly
(e.g., the agent cannot choose an optimal task for her without knowing own type), and hence, the agent does
not want to engage in any task before learning about own self-control.
16 If U I(x; 0) < 0, a time-inconsistent type never completes the task. In this case, if UC(x; 0) < 0 or if
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(ii) means that each type of agent prefers to acquire information right now and to complete
the task in the next period rather than never.17 Note that under Assumption 1, both types
of the agent agree that the task should be completed. Hence, uncertainty and naivete about
own future type is the only reason for procrastination and for non-completion the task.
3.2 Illustrative Example in a Finite Horizon Model
In this subsection, we illustrate a simple numerical example with a finite time horizon (i.e.,
4 ≤ T < ∞) to highlight how procrastination of learning can occur in our model. Because
of the finite time horizon, equilibrium can be pinned down by backward induction and is
generically unique. See Appendix A for the full analysis of a finite horizon model.
Suppose that m = 0, c = 1, b = 32 +  for a sufficiently small  > 0, δ = 1, and
D(t) = 11+rt with r =
1
2 (a time-inconsistent type’s time preference is hyperbolic discounting).
In this case, it can be shown that in every continuation game the time-consistent type
always acquires information (if she has not acquired it yet) and always works on the task
(if she has acquired information). For the time-consistent type, note that U I(x; τ) > 0
for all τ and that completing the task in two periods is the most preferred for her (i.e.,
maxτ U I(x; τ) = U I(x; 2)). Since the agent has to learn her type before completing the
task, the earliest point in time the task can be completed is t = 2 (and learning is done in
t = 1). In what follows, we analyze the behavior of the time-inconsistent type by backward
induction.
First, we characterize the behavior of the time-inconsistent type in t = T . If she has
acquired information, then she completes the task because U I(x; 0) = −c+D(1)b = 23 > 0.
If she has not acquired information, then she cannot complete the task because t = T is the
last period, and hence, her payoff is zero.
Second, we characterize the behavior of the time-inconsistent type in t = T − 1. If she
has already acquired information, then she does not complete the task because U I(x; 1) =
the time-inconsistent type would not want the task to be completed in any future period, then obviously
the time-inconsistent type would never encode the signal. Otherwise, the time-inconsistent type may have
an incentive to encode a signal, but still in this case procrastinating information acquisition can occur.
17 If UC(x; 1) < m, then a time-consistent type never encodes a signal.
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−D(1)c + D(2)b = 112 + 12 > U I(x; 0). Intuitively, akin to O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a,
2001) as well as the subsequent literature which analyzes behavior of sophisticated time-
inconsistent agents, a time-inconsistent type may prefer to delay the completion of the task by
one period rather than to complete it now. Note that this result itself is not procrastination,
as the agent has correct beliefs about when the task will be completed and her actual decisions
follow the beliefs. If she has not acquired information, then she acquires it because both
types will complete the task in the next period and hence Uˆ I(sT−1 = 1) = U I(x; 1) > 0 =
Uˆ I(sT−1 = 0).
Third, consider a continuation game in t = T − 2 in which the time-inconsistent type
has not acquired information. If she chooses to acquire it now, she anticipates that she will
complete the task in t = T − 1 with probability q and do so in t = T with probability 1− q,
and hence Uˆ I(sT−2 = 1) = qU I(x; 1) + (1 − q)U I(x; 2). If she does not acquire information
now, she anticipates that she will complete the task in t = T with probability one, and hence
Uˆ I(sT−2 = 0) = U I(x; 2). Because U I(x; 2) = −D(2)c + D(3)b = 110 + 25 > U I(x; 1), she
does not acquire information in t = T − 2. Intuitively, a time-inconsistent type prefers to
delay acquiring information in order to delay the completion of the task.
Finally, we show the condition under which the time-inconsistent type procrastinates ac-
quiring information. Consider continuation games in t ≤ T−3 in which the time-inconsistent
type has not acquired information. If she acquires it now, she anticipates that she will com-
plete the task in the next period with probability q and do so in some future periods with
probability 1 − q.18 Because maxτ U I(x; τ) = U I(x; 2) in this case, her anticipated ex-
pected utility when she acquires information is at most qU I(x; 1) + (1− q) maxτ U I(x; τ) =
qU I(x; 1) + (1 − q)U I(x; 2). If she does not acquire information now, she anticipates that
she will do so in the next period and will complete the task in two periods with probability
q. Hence, her anticipated expected utility when she does not acquire information is at least
qU I(x; 2). This implies that if qU I(x; 2) > qU I(x; 1) + (1 − q)U I(x; 2), or if q > 67 when
 approaches 0, the time-inconsistent type will choose not to acquire information in any
18 Here, for simplicity of exposition, we do not describe exact equilibrium strategies and beliefs of the
time-inconsistent type. See Appendix A for the full characterization.
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t ≤ T −3.19 Hence, if q > 67 , the time-inconsistent type procrastinates acquiring information
until t = T − 2 on the equilibrium path.
Intuitively, because a time-inconsistent type is (probabilistically) overconfident about own
future self-control, she erroneously thinks that she will acquire information with probability
q in the next period, even when she does not do so now. Hence, as in O’Donoghue and
Rabin (1999a, 2001), the time-inconsistent type may procrastinate information acquisition
— in any period t ≤ T − 3, she thinks that she would acquire information with probability
q in the next period, but actually will not do so.20 Further, unlike O’Donoghue and Rabin
(1999a, 2001), the agent in our model is never surprised by a zero-probability event on the
equilibrium path even when she keeps procrastinating.
If the time-inconsistent type is sufficiently naive (q is sufficiently close to 1), she (erro-
neously) believes that time inconsistency is of little relevance to her. Hence, she believes that
if she acquires information now, she is almost certainly going to complete the task tomorrow,
and if she does not acquire information now, she believes that she will most likely acquire it
in the next period and then complete the task in two periods. The naive time-consistent type
(erroneously) believes that this is the main trade-off she is facing: acquiring information now
and completing the task tomorrow, or acquiring information tomorrow and completing the
task in two periods. This leads to procrastination if the latter option outweighs the former
one.
Perhaps surprisingly, and beyond the original logic of O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a,
2001), our procrastination can occur even when m = 0. This is because a time-inconsistent
type indirectly incurs a cost from learning if U I(x; 2) > U I(x; 1), which does not occur under
quasi-hyperbolic discounting but can occur under hyperbolic discounting (as well as other
functional forms of declining impatience over time).
19 For a sufficiently small but positive  > 0, the condition becomes q + 724 (2q − 1) > 67 .20 Note that, in continuation games in t ≤ T − 3 in which the time-inconsistent type has not acquired
information, the beliefs for her future learning decisions are wrong: in reality, if she does not learn her own
type in period t = T − 3, she will not do so in period t = T − 2 either (because her type is persistent over
time). However, she is naive about it exactly because she has not learned about it yet (and hence keeps
using her initial prior belief).
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3.3 Analysis in an Infinite Horizon Model
In this subsection, we analyze a model with T = ∞ and show under which conditions a
time-inconsistent agent will procrastinate learning information indefinitely, which implies
never completing the task on the equilibrium path. Specifically, we look for an equilibrium
in which (i) once the agent learns about own self-control, both types will complete the task
in the next period, (ii) she always acquires information when she is time-consistent, and (iii)
she will never acquire information when she is time-inconsistent.
We first specify continuation games (i): the agent’s behavior in continuation games in
which the agent has already learned her type. If the agent learned that she is time-consistent,
she chooses to complete the task in any period because Assumption 1 (i) implies UC(x; 0) =
−c + δb > 0. If the agent learned that she is time-inconsistent, Assumption 1 (i) ensures
that there exists an equilibrium in continuation games in which the agent completes the task
in the next period after learning. The proof can be found in the Appendix. When showing
the existence of a non-learning equilibrium, we focus on such an equilibrium in continuation
games. We then derive the condition in which non-learning for time-inconsistent agents is a
unique equilibrium outcome.
We next investigate the agent’s behavior regarding learning about own self-control. Con-
sider continuation games (ii) where the agent is time-consistent. In this case, Assumption 1
(ii) ensures that she chooses to learn about own self-control in our candidate equilibrium.
Now suppose continuation games (iii) where the agent is time inconsistent. Note that
her beliefs about own future actions depend on the beliefs about own future self-control. On
the one hand, the agent (wrongly) believes that she will be time-consistent and hence will
acquire information in the next period with probability q. On the other hand, she (correctly)
anticipates that she will not acquire information in any future period with probability 1− q
in our candidate equilibrium. To show the existence of the equilibrium, we first focus on an
equilibrium in continuation games in which the time-inconsistent type always completes the
task in period t + 1 if she learns about own self-control in period t. Given these beliefs, if
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the time-inconsistent type chooses not to learn, her anticipated expected utility is:
Uˆ It (st = 0) = q
[
−D(1)m+ U I(x; 2)
]
+ (1− q) · 0.
If the time-inconsistent type chooses to learn, her anticipated expected utility is:
Uˆ It (st = 1) = −m+ U I(x; 1).
Hence, there exists an equilibrium in which the time-inconsistent type prefers not to learn
in each period if:
Uˆ It (st = 0) > Uˆ It (st = 1)
⇐⇒ q
[
U I(x; 2)− U I(x; 1)
]
+m [1− qD(1)] > (1− q)U I(x; 1). (1)
Next, we derive the condition under which a time-inconsistent type never chooses to learn
about her self-control problems — and hence never complete the task — in any equilibrium
outcome. In the proof, we show that in any continuation games, a time-consistent type will
always choose to learn and complete the task immediately if
(q − δ)UC(x; 1) +m(1− δ) ≥ 0. (2)
Given this, consider continuation games where a time-inconsistent type has not learned.
Denote the maximum and minimum utility of a time-inconsistent type from completing a task
by U I(x) = maxτ U I(x; τ) and U I(x) = minτ U I(x; τ), respectively. Note that U
I(x) > 0 ≥
U I(x) by Assumption 1 and that limτ→∞ U I(x; τ) = 0. Then, a lower bound of anticipated
expected utility when the time-inconsistent type chooses not to learn is:
U It (st = 0) = q
[







To see the intuition, note that a time-inconsistent type knows how a time-consistent type
will behave. Therefore, with probability q, she believes that she will be time consistent in the
future, acquire the information, and complete the task in two periods. But with probability
1 − q she believes that she will be time inconsistent in the future. In this case, the lowest
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possible payoff is to pay the information acquisition cost as soon as possible but to complete
the task in the least desired period.
Similarly, an upper bound on anticipated expected utility when the time-inconsistent
type chooses to learn is:
U
I
t (st = 1) = −m+ qU I(x; 1) + (1− q)U I(x).
Hence, in any equilibrium outcome, the agent prefers not to learn if:
U It (st = 0) > U
I
t (st = 1)
⇐⇒ q
[
U I(x; 2)− U I(x; 1)
]






The result is summarized as follows.
Proposition 1. Suppose T =∞ and Assumption 1 holds.
(i) If Inequality (1) holds, there exists an equilibrium in which a time-inconsistent type
never learns about own future self-control (and hence never completes the task).
(ii) If Inequalities (2) and (3) hold, a time-inconsistent type never learns about own future
self-control (and hence never completes the task) in any equilibrium outcome.
The intuition of the result is two-fold. First, if the agent is time inconsistent, she may
prefer to complete a task later rather than sooner. Specifically, if the time-inconsistent type
prefers to complete the task in two periods rather than in one period (i.e., if U I(x; 2) >
U I(x; 1)), then she has an incentive to delay acquiring the signal in order to delay task
completion. Second, because the time-inconsistent type is (probabilistically) overconfident
about own future self-control, she overestimates the likelihood that she will acquire the
signal in the future. Specifically, if the degree of naivete (i.e., q) is sufficiently large, the
time-inconsistent type (wrongly) believes that she will most likely acquire the signal in the
next period. Hence, she prefers not acquiring it now to delay task completion. As without
acquiring the information the time-inconsistent types fails to infer from her own actions that
she cannot be time consistent in the next period, she may procrastinate indefinitely.
16
It is worth mentioning that procrastination of learning about own self-control can oc-
cur even when the time-inconsistent type prefers to complete the task in the next period
rather than never (i.e., U I(x; 1) > m). Intuitively, because the time-inconsistent type is
overconfident about own future self-control, she underestimates the possibility that she will
procrastinate learning in the future. As a result, she may prefer to postpone a valuable
learning opportunity again and again.
Furthermore, if the time-inconsistent type is sufficiently naive and has preferences for
a delay, procrastination of learning is a unique equilibrium outcome. Perhaps surprisingly,
even when m = 0, non-learning can occur in the equilibrium. Further, even when m = 0,
non-learning can be a unique equilibrium outcome:
Corollary 1. Suppose T = ∞, Assumption 1 holds, and U I(x; 2) > U I(x; 1). Then, there
exists q¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that for any q > q¯ a time-inconsistent type never learns about own
future self-control (and hence never completes the task) in any equilibrium outcome.
4 Task Choice
In Section 3, we assumed that the agent already faces a specific task to complete. This
section analyzes a situation where the agent has multiple tasks, but she can choose only one
task throughout the game and the optimal choice depends on her type. For example, such
a task could be to choose between different financial contracts. As an illustration, we first
focus on a case where the agent is facing two possible tasks to choose from, and then provide
more general analysis.
4.1 Analysis with a Two-Task Menu
Suppose T = ∞ and the agent can choose one of the following two tasks: x = (−c, b) and
x′ = (0, b′) with −c + δb > δb′ > 0 > −c + D(1)b. We also assume that minτ≥0 U I(x, τ) =
U I(x, 0) = −c + D(1)b. As described in Section 2.1, we assume that the task cannot be
completed in the same period it is chosen. In this full model, we allow the agent to complete
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a task without knowing her self-control problem. We derive the conditions for an equilibrium
in which the time-inconsistent type never learns about own self-control problems nor chooses
a task, whereas the time-consistent type chooses to learn and then complete task x on the
equilibrium path.
First, we characterize the agent’s task-completion behavior after learning own type. It
is straightforward to show that if the agent has chosen task x′, she will complete the task
in every period irrespective of her type and that if the agent has chosen task x, she will
complete the task in every period if she is time-consistent and will never complete the task
if she is time-inconsistent.
Second, suppose the agent has learned about her self-control, but has not yet chosen a
task. In this case, it is straightforward to show that the agent would choose x in any period
if she is time-consistent and would choose x′ in any period if she is time-inconsistent.
Third, suppose the agent has not learned but has chosen a task. Because of the above
assumptions, if the agent has chosen task x′, she will complete the task in every period
irrespective of her type. Also, if the agent has chosen task x, she will complete the task
in every period if she is time-consistent and will never complete the task if she is time-
inconsistent.
Fourth, suppose that the agent has neither learned about own self-control nor chosen
a task. The perceived expected utility of the time-consistent type for each action in our
candidate equilibrium is as follows:
• Choosing x without learning self-control: qUC(x; 1) + (1− q) · 0.
• Choosing x′ without learning self-control: UC(x′; 1).
• Learning self-control: −m+ qUC(x; 2) + (1− q)UC(x′; 2).
• Not doing anything: q(−mδ + UC(x; 3)) + (1− q) · 0.
Note that for the time-consistent type, not doing anything is dominated by choosing x
without learning self-control. Hence, if the agent is time-consistent, she will choose to learn
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if and only if:





δ(1− δ) > qU
C(x; 0) > 1− (1− q)δ
δ
UC(x′; 0) + m
δ2
(4)
Note that Inequality (4) always holds for m = 0 and δ close to one. In what follows, we
focus on the case in which Inequality (4) holds.
Finally, suppose that the agent has neither learned about own self-control nor chosen a
task and that the agent is time-inconsistent. If she chooses to learn and she finds out that
she is time-consistent, she expects that she will choose task x in the next period and then
complete it in two periods. Hence, the perceived expected utility of the time-inconsistent
type for each action in our candidate equilibrium is as follows:
• Choosing x without learning self-control: qU I(x; 1) + (1− q) · 0.
• Choosing x′ without learning self-control: U I(x′; 1).
• Learning self-control: −m+ qU I(x; 2) + (1− q)U I(x′; 2).
• Not doing anything: −q(mD(1) + U I(x; 3)) + (1− q) · 0.
Hence, if the agent is time-inconsistent, she will choose not to do anything if
U I(x; 3)−mD(1) > max
{
U I(x; 1), 1
q
U I(x′; 1), U I(x; 2) + 1− q
q




and Inequality (4) hold.
The intuition here is threefold. First, the time-inconsistent type thinks that she will
acquire the signal about own self-control if she will be time-consistent. Second, because she
is time-inconsistent, she may prefer to complete a task later rather than sooner. For example,
if m = 0 and b′ is sufficiently close to zero, then the time-inconsistent type has an incentive to
postpone acquiring the signal to delay task completion if U I(x; 3) > max{U I(x; 1), U I(x; 2)}.
Third, because the agent is (probabilistically) overconfident about own future self-control,
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she underestimates the likelihood that she will not acquire the signal in the future. The next
proposition summarizes the result:
Proposition 2. Suppose T = ∞ and the agent is facing the menu of x = (−c, b) and
x′ = (0, b′). If Inequalities (4) and (5) hold, there exists an equilibrium in which a time-
inconsistent type never learns about own future self-control nor chooses any task on the
equilibrium path.
Proposition 2 highlights a perverse welfare effect of non-learning in our model: If the
time-inconsistent type would know that she is time-inconsistent, then she would choose task
x′ which gives her strictly positive utility. But because she (erroneously) believes that she is
time-consistent with a high probability, she believes that she will choose task x in the future
with a high probability. Given this (erroneous) belief, she prefers to do nothing to delay the
task completion (in case she will be time consistent). Because her type is time-inconsistent
and is persistent over time, however, she does nothing indefinitely on the equilibrium path.
As a real-world example, suppose that an agent has to choose whether to pursue a
university degree or do an apprenticeship. If she knew she were time-consistent, she would
go to the university this year. If she knew she were time-inconsistent, the high upfront cost
of the university degree is too much for her, so she would choose the apprenticeship this
year. But if she is time-inconsistent and does not know her future type, she may believe
that her future selves would be time-consistent with a high probability and hence go to the
university next year. This is why she does not start the apprenticeship this year, and as a
result, she does not complete any further education.
Example 4.1. Consider the case in which D(t) = 11+rt , r =
1
2 , and δ ' 1. Then, the
assumption −c+ δb > 0 > −c+D(1)b holds if and only if b
c
∈ (1, 32).


















< 15 there exists a q¯ < 1 such that for all q > q¯ the time-consistent type acquires
information and completes task x while a time-inconsistent type will never learn about own
self-control and never choose any task on the equilibrium path.
(ii) If m = 150c and
b′
c
= 110 , Inequality (4) and (5) become:
4












∈ (98 , 32), there is a range for q such that the time-consistent type acquires
information and completes task x while a time-inconsistent type will never learn about own
self-control and never choose any task on the equilibrium path.
Example 4.1 (i) shows that a sufficiently naive time-inconsistent type (q close to one) will
procrastinate information acquisition and task choice indefinitely if b′ is small. The intuition
is as follows: if q is large, the time-inconsistent type (wrongly) believes that it is likely that
x is the optimal task. Therefore, choosing task x′ becomes unattractive. Also, because
choosing task x now will lead to completion in the next period with (perceived) probability
q, the time-inconsistent type might prefer to postpone choosing the task. Therefore, not
doing anything is the only way to commit to postponing completion of task x — which leads
to procrastination.
Note that if b′ approaches zero in Example 4.1 (i), the degree of naivete q ensuring
procrastination goes to zero. This means that when the value of knowing that she will be
time-inconsistent is sufficiently small, she becomes more likely to procrastinate and stick to
a suboptimal decision from her initial perspective. Similarly, if c increases while b
c
is fixed,
the time-inconsistent type is more likely to procrastinate.
Example 4.1 (ii) illustrates that the time-consistent type may choose a task without hav-
ing acquired information under a strictly positive information cost m. This poses additional
restrictions on the degree of naivete q. Intuitively, if the time-consistent type believes that
she will be a particular type with sufficient certainty (q is close to either zero or one), the
information has low perceived value and she will choose the task she believes to be most
likely to match her type. This consideration imposes an upper bound of q for the exis-
tence of our candidate equilibrium. Interestingly, under certain parameters the range of q in
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the candidate equilibrium is smaller in Example 4.1 (ii) than in Example 4.1 (i). That is,
lower learning costs can make time-inconsistent agents more likely to procrastinate on the
equilibrium path.
4.2 Analysis with a General Menu
This subsection analyzes a generalized version of the above infinite-horizon model which
includes more than two tasks in a menu. We look for an equilibrium in which the time-
inconsistent type never learns about own self-control problems nor chooses a task on the
equilibrium path.
Let X = {x1, . . . , xn} be a menu of n tasks of the form xi = (−ci, bi) where ci, bi ≥ 0
for all i. Without loss of generality, we assume that UC(xi; 0) ≥ 0 for all i, as any task
xi that would give the time-consistent type negative utility would never be considered nor
completed by either type because of the assumption D(1) < δ. We assume that each type
of agent has strict preferences for any task completed in any period: Uk(x; t) 6= Uk(x′; t′) for
any k ∈ {C, I}, x, x′ 6= x and t, t′ ≥ 0. Note that this assumption holds generically.
We call any task xi that satisfies U I(xi; 0) ≥ 0 feasible for both types to complete, with
assuming that for any infeasible task the time-inconsistent type will never complete it.21
Denote the most preferred task by the time-consistent type at the beginning of the game
by xC0 = argmaxxi UC(xi; 0). Note that xC0 = argmaxxi UC(xi; t) for any t ≥ 0. Denote the
maximum possible delay (including t∗i = 0) for the time-inconsistent type for completing
task xi by t∗i = argmaxti U I(xi; ti) subject to mint≤t∗i U
I(xi; t) ≥ U I(xi; 0). Denote the most
preferred feasible task and time of completion by the time-inconsistent type at the beginning
of the game by (xI0, t∗) = argmax(xi,ti) U I(xi; ti) subject to U I(xi; 0) ≥ 0 and t ≤ t∗i . To focus
on interesting cases, we assume the following:
Assumption 2 (Feasibility of Task). UC(xC0 ; 0) > 0 > U I(xC0 ; 0) and Uk(xI0, t∗) > 0 for
k ∈ {C, I}.
21 A sufficient condition for this is minτ≥0 U I(xi; τ) = U I(xi; 0) for any infeasible task xi.
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Assumption 2 implies that the time-inconsistent type will never complete the time-
consistent type’s preferred task and that the agent would be better off by choosing different
tasks depending on her type.22
In what follows, we focus on the following candidate equilibrium: for continuation games
(i) in which the agent has already chosen a task xi and has learned own type, the time-
consistent type always completes it, whereas the time-inconsistent type completes it in t∗i
periods upon choosing the task if and only if the task is feasible; for continuation games (ii)
in which the agent has already chosen a task xi but has not learned own type, the time-
consistent type always completes it, whereas the time-inconsistent type completes it in t∗i
periods upon choosing the task if and only if the task is feasible; for continuation games (iii)
in which the agent has not chosen a task but has acquired information, the time-consistent
type always chooses xC0 , whereas the time-inconsistent type always chooses task xI0; and for
continuation games (iv) in which the agent has not done anything, the time-consistent type
always acquires information, whereas the time-inconsistent type does not do anything.
In the following, we specify under which conditions our candidate equilibrium exists. Let
xC = maxxi qUC(xi; 1)+(1−q)UC(xi; t∗i )·1xi and xI = maxxi qU I(xi; 1)+(1−q)U I(xi; t∗i )·1xi
denote the preferred task of the time-consistent type and the time-inconsistent type if she
chooses a task without acquiring information, respectively.23 In the proof, we show that the
equilibrium outcome can be characterized as a menu of at most four options {xC0 , xI0, xC , xI}
and that each type of agent takes a best response in continuation games (i) and (ii).
For continuation games (iii), the time-consistent type prefers to acquire information im-
mediately rather than to choose a task immediately without learning (or to do nothing)
if
−m+ qUC(xC0 ; 2) + (1− q)UC(xI0; t∗ + 1) > qUC(xC ; 1) + (1− q)UC(xC ; tC∗). (8)
Note that if the time-consistent type would choose a task without knowing her type, she
22 If the first part of Assumption 2 were not satisfied, the time-consistent agent would always be better
of picking xC0 immediately without learning her type. If the second part were not satisfied, it might be the
best for the agent to not complete any task.
23 1xi = 1{UI(xi;0)≥0} is an indicator function which takes 1xi = 1 if U I(xi; 0) ≥ 0 and 1xi = 0 otherwise.
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may not prefer to choose xI0 among the feasible tasks. This is because the time-inconsistent
type may have different delays in completing different feasible tasks.
Similarly, for continuation games (iii), the time-inconsistent agent prefers to do nothing
rather than to choose a task immediately without learning if
q(−mD(1) + U I(xC0 ; 3)) > qU I(xI ; 1) + (1− q)U I(xI ; tI∗). (9)
Finally, for continuation games (iii), the time-inconsistent agent prefers to do nothing rather
than to acquire information if
q(−mD(1) + U I(xC0 ; 3)) > −m+ qU I(xC0 ; 2) + (1− q)U I(xI0; t∗ + 1). (10)
The result is summarized as follows:
Proposition 3. Suppose T = ∞ and Assumption 2 holds. If Inequalities (8), (9), and
(10) hold, there exists an equilibrium in which the time-consistent type acquires information
immediately and completes her preferred task, whereas the time-inconsistent type procras-
tinates indefinitely.
For illustration, suppose that m = 0 and q → 1. Then, by Assumption 2, Inequality
(8) holds: the time-consistent type always acquires information. Suppose further that q is
sufficiently close to one (i.e., each type of agent believes that she is time-consistent almost
surely). In this case, Inequalities (9), and (10) are summarized as:
U I(xC0 ; 3) > max{U I(xC0 ; 2), U I(xI ; 1)}.
Intuitively, if the time-inconsistent type chooses to do nothing, she thinks that she will
almost surely be time-consistent and hence will acquire information in the next period,
choose xC0 in two periods, and complete it in three periods. If her perceived utility of
completing xC0 in three periods is higher than completing any task within two periods due
to her time inconsistency, then she prefers to do nothing — leading to procrastination and
non-completion of any task.
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5 Procrastination and Misdirected Learning
This section investigates an extension to our basic model by including learning about an
additional payoff-relevant attribute: ability. Suppose that there are two initially-uncertain
attributes: self-control and ability. The agent is initially uncertain about both attributes.
The agent can acquire perfectly informative signals about each attribute.
As we now have two attributes the agent is uninformed about, we introduce further
notations. Let qd ∈ (0, 1) be the probability with which the agent believes her discounting is
exponential, i.e., the probability that she is time-consistent, and let (1−qd) be the probability
the agent attaches to having discount function D(t). Additionally, the agent now has beliefs
about her ability. We assume that there are only two ability types: high ability aH > 0, and
low ability aL < aH . The agent has beliefs aˆ about her ability: she believes with probability
qa ∈ (0, 1) that she is of high ability and with probability (1− qa) that she is of low ability.
To highlight our key mechanism and results in a simple manner, we examine a model in
which the agent has an opportunity to costlessly and perfectly learn about own ability in
t = 0, and then plays the game described in Section 3 with m = 0. That is, the agent faces
a task x with payoff (−c, bi) where bi ≡ aib depends on her ability. The agent, therefore,
believes her expected ability is aˆ ≡ qaaH + (1− qa)aL, and the expected benefit of the task is
bˆ ≡ aˆb. With slightly abusing the notations, let Ukt (bi; τ − t) = −D(τ − t)c+D(τ − t+ 1)bi
denote a type-k agent’s total utility evaluated in period t when she completes a task in period
τ . We abbreviate subscript t whenever it is clear.
To focus on interesting cases, throughout this section we assume that without learning
about own ability, both types would acquire information about own self-control and work
on the task as soon as possible. Formally, we focus on the case in which maxτ U I(bˆ; τ) =
U I(bˆ; 1) > 0 and U I(bˆ; 0) > 0. The latter condition implies UC(bˆ; 0) = −c+δbˆ > 0 and hence
both types would acquire information about own self-control in t = 1 and work on the task
in t = 2 if they would not learn about own ability in t = 0. It also implies that if each type
would learn about own ability in t = 0 and realize that her ability is bH , then both types
would acquire information about own self-control and work on the task as soon as possible.
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We investigate two cases. First, consider the case in which UC(bL; 0) > 0 and U I(bL; 2) >
0 > U I(bL; 0). In this case, a time-inconsistent type never works on the task once she learns
that her ability is aL. However, from her t = 0 perspective, both types strictly prefer to
complete the task in t = 2. Also, because maxτ U I(bˆ; τ) = U I(bˆ; 1) > 0, both types would
immediately learn about own self-control and then complete the task if they would not learn
about own ability. That is, the agent would strictly prefer to avoid learning own ability to
motivate her future self to complete the task, as analyzed by Carrillo and Mariotti (2000)
and Be´nabou and Tirole (2002).
Second, consider the case in which UC(bL; 0) < 0, U I(bL; 2) < 0, and U I(bH ; 2) >
U I(bH ; 1). The first condition implies that U I(bL; 0) < 0. In this case, each type of agent
never works on the task once she learns that her ability is aL. Note that in principle in-
formation about own ability could be valuable, but in this case learning about own ability
can lead to non-completion of the task when the realized ability is bH . We show that if
Uk(bL; 2) < − qa(1−qd)1−qa Uk(bH ; 2) < 0 holds for each type k ∈ {C, I}, then both time-consistent
and time-inconsistent types strictly prefer to acquire information about own ability in t = 0.
As shown in Section 3, a time-inconsistent type procrastinates learning about own self-control
and hence never works on the task even when her ability is bH if U I(bH ; 2) > U I(bH ; 1).
The following proposition summarizes the results:
Proposition 4. Suppose T = ∞, m = 0, the agent has an opportunity to costlessly learn
about own ability in t = 0, maxτ U I(bˆ; τ) = U I(bˆ; 1) > 0, and U I(bˆ; 0) > 0.
(i) Assume UC(bL; 0) > 0 and U I(bL; 2) > 0 > U I(bL; 0). There exists an equilibrium
in which a time-inconsistent agent strictly prefers to not learn about own ability and she
completes the task in t = 2.
(ii) Assume UC(bL; 0) < 0, U I(bH ; 2) > U I(bH ; 1), and Uk(bL; 2) < − qa(1−qd)1−qa Uk(bH ; 2)
for type k ∈ {C, I}. There exists an equilibrium in which a time-inconsistent agent strictly
prefers to learn about own ability but never learns about own future self-control nor completes
the task.
On the one hand, the result in Proposition 4 (i) is in line with the literature on strategic
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ignorance (Carrillo and Mariotti 2000, Be´nabou and Tirole 2002). In the literature, an agent
chooses not to learn about own ability as a means of internal commitment to improve own
future payoffs. In our model, the agent chooses not to learn about own ability to commit to
completing the task in t = 2.
On the other hand, Proposition 4 (ii) highlights that a time-inconsistent type may not
learn about own future self-control. Non-learning about own self-control in this case is
harmful from her period-0 perspective, because it leads to a non-completion of a task. This
is different from the literature on strategic ignorance, as it looks at learning about own
ability when the agent is perfectly sophisticated (and hence they have already perfectly
learned about own future self-control problems).
But more interestingly, in contrast to Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) and Be´nabou and
Tirole (2002), the time-inconsistent agent endogenously chooses to learn about own ability,
which is harmful from her initial perspective. Without learning about own ability, she
would complete the task in t = 2, and her expected utility from her initial perspective is
higher than the case when she procrastinates and hence never complete the task. As the
time-inconsistent agent is initially overconfident about own future self-control, however, she
takes the same action as the time-consistent type does, which leads to procrastination in the
end. In particular, the result and welfare consequences in Be´nabou and Tirole (2002) that
sophisticated time-inconsistent agents optimally choose not to learn about own ability can
be reversed when we investigate partially-naive agents.
Most importantly, Proposition 4 (ii) highlights how the agent’s endogenous learning deci-
sions can be misdirected under naivete about own future self-control — she chooses to learn
what she should not learn from her initial perspective (i.e., her ability), and she chooses
not to learn what she should (i.e., her self-control). Complementing recent papers such as
Heidhues et al. (2018) and Hestermann and Le Yaouanq (2017), our mechanism based on
procrastination explains why an agent’s learning decisions can be self-defeating even when
she can endogenously choose to learn about all uncertain attributes.
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6 Further Extensions and Discussion
Leisure good. So far, we have only considered situations in which the agent faces in-
vestment goods: a task or good with an immediate cost and a delayed benefit. A natural
extension is to analyze the agent’s learning incentives if they face leisure goods: a task or
good with an immediate benefit and a delayed cost. To describe the implications of such a
case in a simple manner, consider an infinite horizon model in Section 3 with m = 0 and
a modification that the agent now receives a benefit b > 0 immediately and a delayed cost
c > 0 in the next period upon the completion of a task x.
In this case, if U I(x; 1) < 0 < U I(x; 0), the time-inconsistent type may not learn about
own future self-control to prevent herself from completing the task. Intuitively, she chooses
not to learn about own future self-control as a means of internal commitment to avoid
temptation. This result is akin to Proposition 4 (i) as well as the literature on strategic
ignorance (Carrillo and Mariotti 2000, Be´nabou and Tirole 2002), while the agent here
would not learn about own future self-control rather than own ability.
Commitment to future actions. We discuss the predictions of our model when we
allow for commitment technologies. First, in the infinite horizon model in Section 3, if
the agent were given the opportunity to commit to acquiring information in any future
period, then both types of the agent would commit to doing so. Intuitively, as a time-
inconsistent type would prefer to complete a task in some future period rather than never as
ensured by Assumption 1, she would commit to acquiring the information in the future if the
commitment would be possible. By a similar logic, if the agent were given the opportunity
to commit to acquiring information in any future period, the non-learning results would not
occur in Section 4. Therefore, the assumption of non-commitment is crucial to derive the
possibility of non-learning results in our model.
Negative learning cost. While we highlighted how an agent may not learn about own
future self-control even when the learning cost is zero (i.e., m = 0), this result implies that
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the non-learning can occur for some small m < 0. In other words, time-inconsistent people
may be willing to pay a positive cost to stay ignorant. Notably, as our underlying mechanism
is procrastinating learning opportunities, this positive willingness-to-pay for staying ignorant
can occur even in the absence of any type of self-esteem concern (Ko˝szegi 2006; Gottlieb
2014, 2016).
Partial naivete and sophistication. In the literature, partial naivete is often modeled
as a point belief about own future self-control. Specifically, partial naivete is modeled as
βˆ ∈ (β, 1) for quasi-hyperbolic discounting. To allow for a possibility of learning, we assume
that an agent’s belief about own future self-control is a bi-modal distribution where the true
value is in its support.
First, we discuss how we can extend our results to general non-degenerate distributions
on own future self-control. It can be extended straightforwardly in Section 3 because the
agent faces only one task and the only reason an agent cares about own future self-control
is that is has implications for when and how likely it is that the task will be completed.
Specifically, for a given general non-degenerate distribution about own future self-control,
each type of agent can compute the probability of completing the task in t periods for each
t ≥ 1 when she does not learn now. Given these probabilities, each type of agent maximizes
own perceived utility. By contrast, the analysis in Section 4 under general non-degenerate
distributions on own future self-control can be much more complicated, as different types
can choose different tasks at different points in time. The analysis in such cases is left for
future research.
Second, there are other ways of modeling partial naivete even within a bi-modal dis-
tribution. For example, instead of an agent’s type being constant over time, the agents
can have stochastic preferences in each period. Specifically, the true probability of being
time-inconsistent in each period is qL for the time-inconsistent type and qH = 1 for the
time-consistent type. The realization is i.i.d. across time, but the time-inconsistent type
is uncertain about her probability of being time-consistent in a given period. She believes
with probability q ∈ (0, 1) that she will be time-consistent for certain and with probability
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1− q that she will have probability qL, therefore, in a given period she believes to be time-
consistent in future periods with probability qˆ ≡ q · qH + (1 − q)qL = qL + (1 − qL)q > qL.
Defining partial naivete in this way is akin to models of cue-based consumption, where
agents are facing stochastic temptation, but are overestimating how well they will cope with
withstanding temptation from these cues. In the limit case where q = 0, the two types are
identical to the ones in our model, both in actions and beliefs. If qL > 0, i.e., both types
of agent are time-consistent in any given period with a positive probability, the beliefs are
distinct from those in our setting. Our main results would not qualitatively change by this
alternative specification, however.
Last but not least, it could make more sense in many situations to assume that a time-
consistent type is certain about own future self-control from the beginning of the game
whereas a time-inconsistent type is initially (stochastically) overconfident about own future
self-control. Given an assumption that a time-inconsistent type cannot infer own type with-
out acquiring information, our results would qualitatively be the same with this specification,
as the main force of our results is that the time-inconsistent type wants to procrastinate her
learning opportunity to make a delay on completing a task.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper provides a new mechanism for why people do not learn about their self-control
problems over time. We find that individuals may procrastinate a free learning opportunity
indefinitely, even though having the information would make the agent better off. Our results
imply that people may prefer to forget or neglect own self-control problem even when people
are inherently aware of their own self-control problem. Notably, our results do not rely on
agents having image concerns or on using overconfidence as commitment. Indeed, naivete in
our model is mostly harmful.
One potential future direction of research is applying our mechanism to situations which
involve strategic interactions between players. For example, when firms offer contracts which
specify a base contract and a set of options, they often have an incentive to make consumers
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procrastinate cancelling or switching the option when a fraction of consumers are naive
(DellaVigna and Malmendier 2004, Heidhues and Ko˝szegi 2010, Murooka and Schwarz 2018).
Our results imply that firms may have an incentive to let consumers endogenously procras-
tinate learning about own naivete by setting an appropriate contract and pricing structures.
How the procrastination of learning about own self-control problems can be interacted with
strategic concerns of other parties is left for future research.
References
Ali, Nageeb S., “Learning Self-Control,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2011, 126 (2),
857–893.
Ariely, Dan and Klaus Wertenbroch, “Procrastination, Deadlines, and Performance:
Self-Control by Precommitment,” Psychological Science, 2002, 13 (3), 219–224.
Be´nabou, Roland, “The Economics of Motivated Beliefs,” Revue d’Economie Politique,
2015, 125 (5), 665–685.
and Jean Tirole, “Self-Confidence and Personal Motivation,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 2002, 117 (3), 871–915.
and , “Willpower and Personal Rules,” Journal of Political Economy, 2004, 112
(4), 848–886.
and , “Mindful Economics: The Production, Consumption, and Value of Beliefs,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2016, 30 (3), 141–164.
Benjamin, Daniel J., Matthew Rabin, and Collin Raymond, “A Model of Nonbelief
in the Law of Large Numbers,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 2016,
14 (2), 515–544.
Carrillo, Juan D. and Thomas Mariotti, “Strategic Ignorance as a Self-Disciplining
Device,” Review of Economic Studies, 2000, 67 (3), 529–544.
DellaVigna, Stefano, “Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field,” Journal of
Economic Literature, 2009, 47 (2), 315–372.
and Ulrike Malmendier, “Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2004, 119 (2), 353–402.
and , “Paying Not to Go to the Gym,” American Economic Review, 2006, 96 (3),
694–719.
31
Echenique, Federico, Taisuke Imai, and Kota Saito, “Testable Implications of Mod-
els of Intertemporal Choice: Exponential Discounting and Its Generalizations,” 2017.
Working Paper.
Esponda, Ignacio and Demian Pouzo, “Berk-Nash Equilibrium: A Framework for Mod-
eling Agents with Misspecified Models,” Econometrica, 2016, 84 (3), 1093–1130.
Fischer, Dominik, “Motivation by Naivete,” 2018. Working Paper.
Fudenberg, Drew, Gleb Romanyuk, and Philipp Strack, “Active Learning with a
Misspecified Prior,” Theoretical Economics, 2017, 12 (3), 1155–1189.
Gagnon-Bartsch, Tristan, Matthew Rabin, and Joshua Schwartzstein, “Channeled
Attention and Stable Errors,” 2018. Working Paper.
Gottlieb, Daniel, “Imperfect Memory and Choice under Risk,” Games and Economic
Behavior, 2014, 85, 127–158.
, “Will You Never Learn? Self Deception and Biases in Information Processing,” 2016.
Working Paper.
Heidhues, Paul and Botond Ko˝szegi, “Exploiting Naivete about Self-Control in the
Credit Market,” American Economic Review, 2010, 100 (5), 2279–2303.
, , and Philipp Strack, “Unrealistic Expectations and Misguided Learning,”
Econometrica, 2018, 86 (4), 1159–1214.
Herweg, Fabian and Daniel Mu¨ller, “Performance of Procrastinators: On the Value of
Deadlines,” Theory and Decision, 2011, 70 (3), 329–366.
Hestermann, Nina and Yves Le Yaouanq, “It’s Not My Fault! Self-Confidence and
Experimentation,” 2017. Working Paper.
Ko˝szegi, Botond, “Ego Utility, Overconfidence, and Task Choice,” Journal of the European
Economic Association, 2006, 4 (4), 673–707.
Murooka, Takeshi and Marco A. Schwarz, “The Timing of Choice-Enhancing Policies,”
Journal of Public Economics, 2018, 157, 27–40.
O’Donoghue, Ted and Matthew Rabin, “Doing It Now or Later,” American Economic
Review, 1999, 89 (1), 103–124.
and , “Incentives for Procrastinators,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1999,
114 (3), 769–816.
and , “Choice and Procrastination,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2001, 116
(1), 121–160.
32
and , “Procrastination on Long-Term Projects,” Journal of Economic Behavior
& Organization, 2008, 66 (2), 161–175.
Schwartzstein, Joshua, “Selective Attention and Learning,” Journal of the European Eco-
nomic Association, 2014, 12 (6), 1423–1452.
Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian, “Time Preferences and Bargaining,” Econometrica,
2018, 86 (1), 173–217.
Skiba, Paige Marta and Jeremy Tobacman, “Payday Loans, Uncertainty and Dis-




A Task Completion: Analysis in a Finite Period Model
We here formally analyze when procrastination will occur in a task completion setting under
a finite time horizon (i.e., T < ∞). This corresponds to environments in which there is a
deadline for task completion (e.g., filing a tax return).
Decisions after learning. By Assumption 1, the task is worthwhile for both types of
agents. Because of the properties of a finite horizon decision problem, if the agents have
learned their type, they will complete the task at the latest in the last period. Let τ =
min{τ |U I(x; 0) ≥ U I(x; τ)} denote the earliest period in which the agent prefers to complete
the task immediately rather than in τ periods. By Assumption 1, both types of agents
complete the task in t = T if they have not yet done so. When the task will be completed
is summarized in the following lemma:
Lemma A.1. Suppose T < ∞ and Assumption 1 holds. Consider a continuation game in
period τ ≥ 1 in which the agent has already learned her type. Then,
(i) If the agent is time-consistent, she completes the task immediately.
(ii) If the agent is time-inconsistent, she completes the task in the first period t ≥ τ that
satisfies t = T − nτ where n ∈ N0.
Proof. (i) is immediate. We here prove (ii).
In period t = T , the payoff from completing the task immediately for a time-inconsistent
agent is U I(x; 0). Not completing immediately means the task will never be completed, and
she receives zero payoffs. By Assumption 1, the agent prefers to complete the task.
In t = T − 1, the agent knows that the task will be completed in the last period if not
now. If U I(x; 0) ≥ U I(x; 1) (i.e., completing now is preferred), then in t = T − 2 the agent
knows that the task will be completed in t = T − 1 if not now. Therefore, the task will be
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completed if U I(x; 0) ≥ U I(x; 1). By induction, the agent will therefore always complete the
task immediately when U I(x; 0) ≥ U I(x; 1).
If U I(x; 0) < U I(x; 1), the sophisticated time-inconsistent type would not complete the
task in t = T − 1 and postpone until t = T . If this is the case, then in t = T − 2 the
agent knows that not completing the task now means that the task will only be completed
two periods from now. Hence, the agent will complete the task in t = T − 2 if and only if
U I(x; 0) ≤ U I(x; 2). If this inequality does not hold, then the agent keeps postponing until
period t = T − τ which satisfies U I(x; 0) < U I(x; τ). If there does not exist such τ ≤ T − 1,
then no matter when she has learned about own self-control, she postpones completing the
task until t = T . If such τ ≤ T − 1 exists, then she postpones at most τ periods.24 Because
τ = min{τ |U I(x; 0) ≥ U I(x; τ)}, the agent knows that she will complete the task in t = T
and in t = T − τ if τ < T .
In t = T − τ − 1, the agent knows that if she postpones the task, it will be completed
in the next period, and she will therefore postpone to complete the task now if and only if
τ ≥ 0. As above, she keeps postponing for τ periods. By induction, the agent will complete
the task in period t ≥ 1 if and only if t ∈ {t ∈ N|t = T − nτ, n ∈ N0}. This completes
Lemma A.1.
Note that UC(x; k) = δkUC(x; 0) for the time-consistent type. Hence, in any period t,
the agent will always complete the task immediately if she is time consistent and the task
has not yet been completed.
Lemma A.1 (ii) implies that a time-inconsistent type completes the task in every τ
periods. Its intuition is as follows. Because she is perfectly sophisticated about her future self-
control after learning, she knows she will complete the task in the last period and therefore
not complete it in the second to last period if U I(x; 0) < U I(x; 1). In the third to last period,
she will complete the task if she prefers completing it immediately over completing it in two
periods (i.e., U I(x; 0) ≥ U I(x; 2)); otherwise, she will not. By induction, the agent completes
the task in any period t = T − nτ and there is a cycle of length τ . Note that this result is
24 From Assumption 1, we know that if T is large enough, there will be a τ < T such that the agent would
complete the task immediately rather than in τ periods.
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not procrastination, as the agent has correct beliefs about when the task will be completed
and her actual decisions coincide with the beliefs. This result is akin to O’Donoghue and
Rabin (1999a, 2001) as well as the subsequent literature which analyzes the behavior of
sophisticated time-inconsistent agents.
Information acquisition. Next, we investigate conditions under which each type of agent
will acquire information. We focus on deriving the conditions for our equilibrium of interest:
an equilibrium in which the time-inconsistent type procrastinates information acquisition
while the time-consistent type always acquires information.
We first analyze the actions for the time-consistent type. Note that in this case she is
underconfident about own future self-control: she thinks she will be time-inconsistent with
probability 1 − q. If U I(x; 1) ≤ U I(x; 0), nevertheless, she will complete the task in the
next period with probability one. Otherwise, she takes into account the delay in case her
future self would be time-inconsistent and, hence, would complete the task only in period
t = T − nτ . In this case, the most stringent condition to acquire information in this case is
that the agent expects a delay of τ periods in case her future self would be time-inconsistent.
The result is summarized in the following lemma:
Lemma A.2. Suppose T <∞ and Assumption 1 holds. If an agent is time-consistent, she
will acquire information in any continuation game if either of the following holds:
(i) U I(x; 1) ≤ U I(x; 0),
(ii) U I(x; 1) > U I(x; 0) and q(1− δ)UC(x; 1) ≥ (1− δq − (1− q)δτ−1)m.
Proof. (i) If U I(x; 1) ≤ U I(x; 0), both the time-inconsistent and the time-consistent agent
will complete the task immediately upon learning their type. Therefore, the payoff from
acquiring information for the time-consistent agent is
UˆCt (st = 1) = −m+ UC(x; 1) > 0,
where the last inequality is from Assumption 1.
36
We show that, if the time-consistent agent postpones information acquisition, she will get
a lower payoff no matter what her beliefs about her future information acquisitions. If she
believes a time-consistent agent will acquire information in k periods and a time-inconsistent
agent in h periods, her payoff would be:
UˆCt (st = 0) = q(−δkm+ UC(x; k + 1)) + (1− q)(−δhm+ UC(x;h+ 1))
= (qδk + (1− q)δh)(−m+ UC(x; 1)) < −m+ UC(x; 1).
Hence, the time-consistent agent will always complete the task immediately if U I(x; 1) ≤
U I(x; 0).
(ii) If U I(x; 1) > U I(x; 0), the time-inconsistent type may postpone completing the task.
From Lemma A.1, the time-inconsistent type will postpone the task for cycles of τ periods.
In t = T−1, the agent knows the task will be completed in the next period. In t = T−2, the
time-inconsistent type believes that the task will be completed in t = T − 1 with probability
q. Therefore, she will acquire information if:
UˆCT−2(sT−2 = 0) = −m+ qUC(x; 1) + (1− q)UC(x; 2) ≥ −δm+ UC(x; 2) = UˆCT−2(sT−2 = 0)
⇔ UC(x; 1) ≥ m
q
.
By the same logic, in t = T − τ where τ ≤ τ , the agent knows that the time-inconsistent
agent will postpone until t = T to complete the task and until t = T − 1 to acquire
information. Hence, the time-consistent type prefers acquiring information immediately if
−m+ qUC(x; 1) + (1− q)UC(x; τ) ≥ q(−δm+ UC(x; 2)) + (1− q)(−δτ−1m+ UC(x; τ))
⇔ UC(x; 1) ≥ (1− qδ − (1− q)δ
τ−1)m
(1− δ)q . (11)
The RHS of Inequality (11) is increasing in τ , so the longer the time-inconsistent type is
going to delay the completion, the more likely it is that the time-consistent type will not
acquire information because of the immediate cost of learning m ≥ 0. Since τ is the longest
period in which the time-inconsistent type will delay completing the task upon learning her
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type, the time-consistent agent will always complete the task immediately if:
UC(x; 1) ≥ (1− qδ − (1− q)δ
τ−1)
(1− δ)q m. (12)
This completes Lemma A.2.
Condition (i) ensures that both types would complete the task immediately upon learning
their type, and hence, the time-consistent agent will acquire the information immediately
to maximize her expected payoff. Condition (ii) covers the case where the time-inconsistent
agent postpones task completion. In this case, the time-consistent agent is facing a trade-
off: acquiring information immediately leads to incurring cost m with certainty, but only
completing the task in the next period with probability q. If (ii) is satisfied, however, the
time-consistent agent will not postpone acquiring information in any period. Note that
Lemma A.2 holds when m is close to zero or q is close to one.
Next, we analyze the actions for the time-inconsistent type. First, we illustrate conditions
in which the time-inconsistent type delay acquiring information in t = T−2. Because the last
period she can acquire information to complete the task is in t = T−1, Assumption 1 (ii) and
Lemma A.1 ensure that the agent will acquire information in t = T−1. Given this, acquiring
information in t = T −2 will lead the time-consistent type to complete the task in t = T −1,
but the time-inconsistent type will delay the task until t = T if U I(x; 1) > U I(x; 0). Hence,
for the time-inconsistent agent in t = T − 2, the subjective expected payoff from acquiring
information immediately is
Uˆ IT−2(sT−2 = 1) = −m+ qU I(x; 1) + (1− q)U I(x; 2).
If she does not acquire information, she (correctly) anticipates that she will acquire it in
the next period and complete the task with certainty in two periods. Hence, the subjective
expected payoff from not acquiring information in t = T − 2 is
Uˆ IT−2(sT−2 = 0) = −mD(1) + U I(x; 2).
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Therefore, the time-inconsistent agent will prefer not to acquire information in t = T − 2 if
−mD(1) + U I(x; 2) > −m+ qU I(x; 1) + (1− q)U I(x; 2)
⇔ q(U I(x; 2)− U I(x; 1)) +m(1−D(1)) > 0. (13)
Note that she will always prefer to delay if U I(x; 2) > U I(x; 1). Intuitively, a time-inconsistent
type indirectly incurs a cost from learning in this case because learning itself changes own
future actions.
We now show the condition under which the time-inconsistent type procrastinates ac-
quiring information in t = T − 3. In period t = T − 3, she wrongly believes that she
would acquire information in t = T − 2 with positive probability. Suppose that U I(x; 2) >
U I(x; 1) > U I(x; 0) and Inequality (12) holds. Then, upon acquiring information in t = T−3,
the agent believes that she will complete the task in the next period if and only if her future
type will be time-consistent. Hence,
Uˆ IT−3(sT−3 = 1) = −m+ qU I(x; 1) + (1− q)U I(x; 3).
If she does not acquire information in t = T − 3, she (wrongly) anticipates that she will
acquire information in the next period with probability q. Hence,
Uˆ IT−3(sT−3 = 0) = q(−mD(1) + U I(x; 2)) + (1− q)(−mD(2) + U I(x; 3)).
Note that the beliefs for her future learning decisions are wrong: in reality, if she does not
learn her own type in t = T −3, she will not do so in t = T −2 because her type is persistent
over time. However, she is naive about this exactly because she has not acquired information
yet and hence keeps using her initial prior belief.
Combining these two conditions, the agent will not acquire information in t = T − 3,
while wrongly believing that she would acquire information in t = T − 2 with probability q,
if
q(U I(x; 2)− U I(x; 1)) +m(1− qD(1)) > m(1− q)D(2). (14)
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Note that here the logic of procrastination — a time-inconsistent type (in our model, prob-
abilistically) overestimates own future self-control and hence not taking an action now — is
akin to the one in O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a, 2001).
The logic and derivations are the same in periods t < T−3, although there are additional
conditions depending on τ . The result for procrastination until t = T − 1 is summarized as
follows:
Proposition A.1. Suppose T < ∞ and Assumption 1 holds. If U I(x; 2) > U I(x; 1) >
U I(x; 0), Inequality (12), and
q(U I(x; 2)− U I(x; 1)) +m(1− qD(1)) > max
n,k
(1− q)[mD(nτ)− U I(x;nτ + k) + U I(x; k)]
where n ∈ N0, k ∈ N, k < τ, and nτ + k ≤ T,
hold, then there exists a unique equilibrium outcome in which a time-inconsistent type will
procrastinate learning about own future self-control until t = T − 1.
Proof. If U I(x; 1) > U I(x; 0), the time-inconsistent agent will complete the task in periods
t = T − nτ where n ∈ N0. By Assumption 1, the time-inconsistent type will acquire
information in t = T −1 and complete the task in t = T . In t = T −2, acquiring information
means that the task will be completed with perceived probability q in t = T − 1 and with
(1− q) in t = T . Postponing means information will be acquired with certainty at t = T − 1
and completed with certainty at t = T . Therefore, the time-inconsistent agent will postpone
information acquisition if:
−m+ qU I(x; 1) + (1− q)U I(x; 2) < −mD(1) + U I(x; 2)
⇔ q(U I(x; 2)− U I(x; 1)) +m(1−D(1)) > 0. (15)
Given that this inequality and τ > 2, then in t = T − 3, acquiring information immediately
means the task will be completed in the next period with probability q, but the task will
only be completed in period t = T with probability 1 − q. If the time-inconsistent agent
postpones now, she believes that the information will be acquired in the next period with
probability q and the task will be completed in two periods from now with probability q,
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but with probability 1− q the information will be acquired in period t = T − 1 and the task
will be completed in t = T . The time-inconsistent type will therefore postpone information
acquisition if:
−m+ qU I(x; 1) + (1− q)U I(x; 3) < q(−mD(1) + U I(x; 2)) + (1− q)(−mD(2) + U I(x; 3))
⇔ q(U I(x; 2)− U I(x; 1)) +m(1− qD(1)) > +m(1− q)D(3).
In general, when t = T − τ where 2 ≤ τ ≤ τ , the time-inconsistent type will postpone
acquiring information if
q(U I(x; 2)− U I(x; 1)) +m(1− qD(1)) > m(1− q)D(τ − 1).
The RHS of this inequality is decreasing in τ , so the inequality becomes the most stringent
when τ = 2. Hence, if q(U I(x; 2)−U I(x; 1)) +m(1− qD(1)) > m(1− q)D(1) or equivalently
q(U I(x; 2)−U I(x; 1))+m(1−D(1)) > 0, the time-inconsistent agent will postpone informa-
tion acquisition for at least τ periods. A sufficient condition for the time-inconsistent agent
to procrastinate for τ periods is U I(x; 2) > U I(x; 1).
In t = T − τ − 1, the time-inconsistent type knows that if she acquires information, the
task will be completed with certainty in the next period, hence her expected payoff is
UˆT−τ−1(sT−τ−1 = 1) = −m+ U I(x; 1).
If she chooses not to acquire information, she knows that the time-consistent agent will
acquire information in the next period, but the time-inconsistent agent will only acquire
information in t = T − 1. Hence, her expected payoff is
UˆT−τ−1(sT−τ−1 = 0) = q(−mD(1) + U I(x; 2)) + (1− q)(−mD(τ) + U I(x; τ + 1)).
Hence, she will prefer not acquiring the information in t = T − τ − 1 if
q(U I(x; 2)− U I(x; 1)) +m(1− qD(1)) > (1− q)(mD(τ)− U I(x; τ + 1) + U I(x; 1)).
When q approaches 1, this reduces to Inequality (15). Whether this condition is generally
stronger or weaker than Inequality (15) is not clear. If this assumption holds, however, the
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agent will procrastinate for an additional τ periods. This follows from the same argument
as before.
By induction, for each t = T − nτ such that t ≥ 1 and n ∈ N0, we need to check
whether the agent will prefer to acquire information or not. The agent is always comparing
acquiring information now and completing the task with certainty tomorrow to the case
where the time-inconsistent type will procrastinate until the second to last period and the
time-consistent type will acquire information in the next period. Therefore, if
UˆT−nτ−k(sT−nτ−k = 1) = −m+ qU I(x; 1) + (1− q)U I(x; k)
< UˆT−nτ−k(sT−nτ−k = 0) = q(−mD(1) + U I(x; 2)) + (1− q)(−mD(nτ) + U I(x;nτ + k))
or equivalently
q(U I(x; 2)− U I(x; 1)) +m(1− qD(1)) > (1− q)(mD(nτ)− U I(x;nτ + k) + U I(x; k))
for any n ∈ N0 and k ∈ N where k < τ and nτ +k ≤ T , then the time-inconsistent agent will
procrastinate information acquisition for any t < T −1. Note also that, given this condition,
we have derived the time-inconsistent type’s learning decision in all continuation games and
hence the equilibrium outcome has been pined down uniquely.
To see the intuition, suppose that a time-consistent type always chooses to acquire infor-
mation and completes the task in every period. Intuitively, because a time-inconsistent type
is (probabilistically) overconfident about own future self-control, she erroneously thinks that
she will acquire information with probability q in the next period, even when she actually
does not do so now. Note that the time-inconsistent type evaluates her anticipated future
outcomes with her current (i.e., time-inconsistent) preferences. Hence, akin to O’Donoghue
and Rabin (1999a, 2001), the time-inconsistent type may procrastinate information acqui-
sition — in any period t < T − 1, she thinks that she would acquire information with
probability q in the next period, but actually will not do so with probability one.
Perhaps surprisingly, and beyond the original logic of O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a,
2001), our procrastination can occur even when m = 0. This is because a time-inconsistent
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type indirectly incurs a cost from learning if U I(x; 2) > U I(x; 1), unlike for quasi-hyperbolic
discounting. Corollary A.1 highlights the result:
Corollary A.1. Suppose T < ∞ and U I(x; 2) > U I(x; 1) > U I(x; 0). Then, for any
m ≥ 0, there exists a q¯ < 1 such that for any q ∈ [q¯, 1) there is a unique equilibrium
outcome in which the time-consistent type will acquire information immediately while the
time-inconsistent type will procrastinate acquiring information until t = T − 1.
B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1.
(i) We look for an equilibrium in which once the agent learns about own self-control, both
types will complete the task in the next period, she always acquires information when she is
time-consistent, and she will never acquire information when she is time-inconsistent.
First, we investigate continuation games where the agent’s behavior in continuation games
in which the agent has already learned her type. If the agent learned that she is time-
consistent, she always chooses to complete the task as Assumption 1 (i) implies UC(x; 0) =
−c + δb > 0. Suppose that the agent learned that she is time-inconsistent. Because D(t)
is decreasing in t, −cD(t) + bD(t + 1) approaches zero as t goes to +∞, Assumption 1 (i)
ensures that there exists a τ ∈ N such that U I(x; 0) = −c+D(1)b ≥ −cD(τ) +D(τ + 1)b =
U I(x; τ). Let denote τ = min{τ |U I(x; 0) ≥ U I(x; τ)}. Consider an equilibrium candidate in
continuation games where if she learned in period τ that her type is time-inconsistent, she
will complete the task in periods t = τ + 1 + nτ and otherwise do not complete it, where
n ∈ N0. Then, akin to akin to O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a, 2001), by the definition of τ ,
she actually follows the plan. Hence, there exists an equilibrium in continuation games in
which the time-inconsistent type always completes the task in the next period after learning.
Second, we investigate continuation games where a time-consistent type has not learned.
In this case, the expected payoff of her from acquiring information immediately in our can-
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didate equilibrium is:
UˆC(s0 = 1) = −m+ UC(x; 1).
If she does not do so, in our candidate equilibrium she believes that she will acquire infor-
mation in the next period if she will be a time-consistent type and will never do so if she
will be a time-inconsistent type. Hence. her expected payoff is:
UˆC(s0 = 0) = q(−mδ + UC(x; 2)) + (1− q) · 0 = qδ(−m+ UC(x; 1)).
By Assumption 1 (ii), she always prefers to acquire information immediately in our candidate
equilibrium.
Continuation games where a time-inconsistent type has not learned are analyzed in the
main text.
(ii) Note that in any continuation game where the agent has learned that she is time-
consistent, she always chooses to complete the task as Assumption 1 (i) implies UC(x; 0) =
−c+ δb > 0.
We here prove that in continuation games where a time-consistent type has not learned,
she always chooses to learn. Given the above behavior, note that the expected payoff of
her from acquiring information immediately is at least −m+ qUC(x; 1) + (1− q)U I(x; τ) >
−m + qUC(x; 1), whereas the expected payoff of her from not acquiring information is at
most −δm + UC(x; 2) = −mδ + δUC(x; 1). Hence, in any such continuation games, the
time-consistent type always chooses to learn if (q − δ)UC(x; 1) +m(1− δ) ≥ 0.
Continuation games where a time-inconsistent type has not learned are analyzed in the
main text.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2.
Provided in the main text.
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B.3 Proof of Proposition 3.
We derive conditions for the following candidate equilibrium: for continuation games (i) in
which the agent has already chosen a task xi and has learned own type, the time-consistent
type always completes it, whereas the time-inconsistent type completes it in t∗i periods upon
choosing the task if and only if the task is feasible; for continuation games (ii) in which
the agent has already chosen a task xi but has not learned own type, the time-consistent
type always completes it, whereas the time-inconsistent type completes it in t∗i periods upon
choosing the task if and only if the task is feasible; for continuation games (iii) in which the
agent has not chosen a task but has acquired information, the time-consistent type always
chooses xC0 , whereas the time-inconsistent type always chooses task xI0; and for continuation
games (iv) in which the agent has not done anything, the time-consistent type always acquires
information, whereas the time-inconsistent type does not do anything.
It is straightforward to check that the time-consistent type takes a best response in each
of continuation games (i), (ii), and (iii). By the definition of t∗i , the time-inconsistent type
takes a best response in each of continuation games (i) and (ii). By the definition of (xI0, t∗),
the time-inconsistent type also takes a best response in each of continuation games (iii). Give
them, note that in our candidate equilibrium, the equilibrium outcome can be characterized
by a menu of at most four options {xC0 , xI0, xC , xI}.
We now investigate continuation games (vi). The time-consistent type’s expected payoffs
in our candidate equilibrium by taking each of her actions are:
• Choosing xi without learning: qUC(xi; 1) + (1− q)UC(xi; t∗i ) · 1xi .
• Learning: −m+ qUC(xC0 ; 2) + (1− q)UC(xI0; t∗ + 1).
• Not doing anything: q(−mδ + UC(xC0 ; 3)) + (1− q) · 0.
Here, not doing anything is always dominated by picking xC0 without knowing her type.
The time-inconsistent type’s expected payoffs in our candidate equilibrium by taking
each of her actions are:
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• Choosing xi without learning: qU I(xi; 1) + (1− q)U I(xi; t∗i ) · 1xi ,
• Learning: −m+ qU I(xC0 ; 2) + (1− q)U I(xI0; t∗ + 1),
• Not doing anything: q(−mD(1) + U I(xC0 ; 3)) + (1− q) · 0.
Inequalities (8), (9), and (10) are derived by comparing each of the above cases, and give
these conditions, each type of the agent takes a best response in each of continuation games
(iv).
B.4 Proof of Proposition 4.
(i) As in the main text, the assumption U I(bL; 0) < 0 ensures that a time-inconsistent type
never works on the task once she learns that her ability is aL. However, from her t = 0
perspective, no matter which type the agent is, she prefers to complete the task in two
periods rather than never. Also, the assumption U I(bˆ; 0) = −c + D(1)bˆ > 0 implies that
−c + δbˆ > 0 and maxτ UC(bˆ; τ) = UC(bˆ; 0). Hence, if the agent does not learn about own
ability in t = 0, then both types would immediately learn about own self-control in t = 1
and complete the task in t = 2. Therefore, such an equilibrium exists.
(ii) We look for an equilibrium in which a time-consistent type acquires information about
own ability and then works on the task if and only if she learns that her ability is aH whereas
a time-inconsistent type acquires information about own ability and never works on the task
on the equilibrium path, and both types would work on the task as soon as possible if they
would not acquire information about own ability in t = 0.
Note first that each type of agent never works on the task once she learns that her ability
is aL. Since information regarding ability is valuable, a time-consistent type chooses to learn
about own ability in t = 0 and then completes the task if and only if her ability is aH . To
check this, given the above strategies, her anticipated expected utility in t = 0 when she
chooses to learn about own ability is:
qa
[
qd · UC(bH ; 2) + (1− qd) · 0
]
+ (1− qa) · 0 = qaqdUC(bH ; 2) > 0.
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Because the assumption U I(bˆ; 0) > 0 implies that −c + δbˆ > 0, her anticipated expected
utility in t = 0 when she chooses not to learn about own ability is:
qa · UC(bH ; 2) + (1− qa) · UC(bL; 2).
Hence, the time-consistent type strictly prefers to learn in t = 0 if UC(bL; 2) < − qa(1−qd)1−qa UC(bH ; 2) <
0. Note that this condition holds if qd is sufficiently close to one.
We now show that the time-inconsistent type strictly prefers to acquire information about
own ability in t = 0. In t = 0, given the above strategies, her anticipated expected utility
when she chooses to learn about own ability is:
qa
[
qd · U I(bH ; 2) + (1− qd) · 0
]
+ (1− qa) · 0 = qaqd · U I(bH ; 2).
Because of the assumption maxτ U I(bˆ; τ) = U I(bˆ; 1) > 0, her anticipated expected utility in
t = 0 when she chooses not to learn about own ability is:
qa · U I(bH ; 2) + (1− qa) · U I(bL; 2).
Hence, the time-inconsistent type strictly prefers to learn in t = 0 if U I(bL; 2) < − qa(1−qd)1−qa U I(bH ; 2) <
0. Note that this condition is reduced to U I(bL; 2) < 0 as qd approaches one. From t = 1 on,
notice that if Inequality (1) with b = bH and m = 0 or equivalently U I(bH ; 2) > U I(bH ; 1) > 0
holds, then the equilibrium behavior for each type in t ≥ 1 is exactly the same as in Section
3.
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